






Social Constructivism and Methodology of Science
Abstract
Scientific practice is a type of social practice, and every enterprise of knowledge in general 
exhibits important social dimensions. But should the fact that scientific practice is born out 
of and tied to the collaborative efforts of the members of a social group be taken to affect the 
products of these practices as well? In this paper, I will try in to give an affirmative answer 
to this question. My strategy will be to argue that the aim of science is partially determined 
by a socio-historical context and that this aim, together with the available background 





1. Values, interests and social constructions
Scientific	practice	is	a	social	practice,	and	every	enterprise	of	knowledge	in	
general	 exhibits	 important	 social	 dimensions.	 But	 should	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
scientific	practice	 is	born	out	of	and	 tied	 to	 the	collaborative	efforts	of	 the	
members	of	a	social	group	be	taken	to	affect	the	products	of	these	practices	
as	well?	Should	we	understand	the	content	of	science	as	being	dependent	and	
tied	to	 the	contingent	facts	about	 the	social	group	in	which	it	 is	produced?	
Those	who	believe	that	we	should	do	this	usually	opt	for	replacing






1.1. A social constructivism interlude
According	to	social	constructivists,	science	should	be	understood	as	embed-
ded	within	a	certain	socio-cultural	context	 that	determines	 its	 features.	Re-
garding	science	this	way	usually	involves	the	following	considerations:
A. Metaphysical considerations	 –	 the	 objects	 of	 science	 are	 not	 to	 be
found	 in	nature,	but	are	built	by	 the	scientific	community	(i.e.	by	a






































Thus,	 scientific	 objects	 and/or	 scientific	 knowledge	 are	 constructed.	 But	
what	does	it	mean	to	say	that	something	is	socially	constructed?	What	do	the	
constructivists	have	in	mind	when	they	are	claiming	that	science	is	socially	
constructed?	The	first	answer	 that	comes	 to	our	mind	 is	 that	science	 is	 the	









Second	 of	 all,	we	 can	 understand	 this	 claim	 in	 contrast	with	 the	 idea	 that	
something	is	discovered.	When	the	social	constructivists	are	saying	that	sci-








































1.2. The role of values in science
Classical	view	about	 the	role	of	values	 in	science	 is	categorical:	science	 is	
value-free.	This	can	be	found	already	in	Galileo’s	discussion	about	“the	facts	
of	Nature,	which	remain	death	and	inexorable	to	our	wishes”	(Galileo	1957,	










changeably.	This	will	 allow	me	 to	 recast,	 in	
the	next	 section,	at	 least	a	part	of	 the	social	
constructivism	issue	in	terms	of	the	problem	
of	values	in	science.	The	idea	here	is	that	we	
value	what	we	 are	 interested	 in	 and	we	 are	
interested	 in	 those	 things	 that	 we	 value	 the	
most.	So,	we	can	take	interests	as	being	noth-





























































chances	of	 attaining.	 Is	 the	goal	of	 science	 really	knowledge?	What	 I	will	
try	to	do4	in	the	next	sections	is	to	show	that	this	view	about	science’s	aim	is	
problematic.












that	 invest	 in	science	 through	their	own	research	foundations	and	there	are	
firms	that	develop	in-house	research	programs	or	provide	funds	for	external	
ones.





that	 takes	 place	 in	 our	 society	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 commercialization	 of	 re-
search.










If	 everything	 revolves	 around	 social	 inter-
ests	and	 is	oriented	 to	 social	goals,	 then	 the	
social	 values	 flow	 throughout	 every	 human	
practice.
4
Actually,	 I’m	 sketching	only	 the	 outlines	 of	
an	argument	because	filling	in	the	details	(ex-
amples,	details	of	different	positions,	extend-
ed	 counterargument	 and	 historical	 support)	








NSF	 gives	 us	 the	 money,	 they	 tell	 us	 what	
research	 they	want	 done.	 [If]	DoD	gives	 us	
the	money,	[its]	the	government	…	Why	is	it	




















research,	 introducing	 ‘the	 capitalization	 of	 knowledge’	 as	 an	 academic	 goal.	 Firms	 develop	
training	 to	 ever	 higher	 levels	 and	 share	 knowledge	 through	 joint	 ventures,	 acting	 a	 bit	 like	



























A. The ontological thesis –	 expresses	 the	 scientific	 realist’s	 belief	 that	
most	of	 the	unobservable	entities	postulated	 in	a	 (mature)	scientific	
context	populate	the	world	as	well	as	observable	objects	do.
B.	 The semantic thesis	–	takes	the	theoretical	claims	about	the	unobserv-
ables	as	being,	as	well	as	those	about	observables,	truth-conditioned	
descriptions	of	an	independent	reality.
C.	 The epistemological thesis	–	is	making	explicit	the	trust	that	scientific	
theories	 are	 our	 best	 sources	 of	 knowledge	 about	 the	whole	world:	
observable	and	unobservable.






















reformulate	 the	 above	 realist	 axiological	 thesis	 by	 taking	 into	 account	 the	
discussion	from	our	previous	section	about	the	capitalization	of	knowledge.	
We	have	the	following	thesis:
C.K.R:	Science aims to give us market competitive and social relevant 












C.K.E:	Science aims to give us market competitive and social relevant 
results; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves as belief only that 















cation	 implies	 a	 second	mission	 of	 research	
that	 in	 turn	 propels	 a	 third	 mission	 of	 eco-
nomic	 and	 social	 development”	 (Etzkowitz	







research.	 Therefore,	 if	 a	 university	 focuses	
on	 the	 latter,	 it	 handicaps	 and	 weakens	 the	























C.K.*R: Science aims [mostly] at market competitive and social relevant 
knowledge of the world; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the 







seeking	business,	 so	we	don’t	need	 to	abandon	a	 realist	position	and	adopt	
some	sort	of	empiricism	(C.K.E thesis	above)	just	because	of	it.	Or	do	we?

































–	are	more	 than	empirically	adequate,	 that	 they	are	approximately	
true.	In	Boyd’s	words:	“A	satisfactory	naturalistic	answer	regarding	
the	instrumental	reliability	of	each	of	 these	methodological	princi-















theoretical	 knowledge	 leading	 to	 improvements	 in	methodology	which,	 in	


















From	 this	 perspective,	 one	 can	 represent	methods	 as	 some	 sort	 of	 impera-
tives:
I. M.: You ought to do X, if you aim at Y [where	X	can	be	taken	as	a	set	
of	rules].
10
The	principles	Boyd	 is	 referring	 to	 here	 are	



















G. M.: If you want Y, then you should want X also, because, from what we 
know, doing X improves the chances of attaining Y [where	X	can	be	taken	
as	a	set	of	values].
This	 formulation	 (especially	 the	 “from	what	we	know”	part)	 brings	 to	 the	


























































































































some	guidelines	when	conducting	an	experiment	 for	 testing	 the	outcome	
predicted	by	some	theory,	for	example,	or	for	measuring	a	certain	quantity	
–	 they	 are	 following	 strict	 rules	 that	 guarantee	 that	 the	 outcome	of	 their	
activity	is	accepted	by	their	(scientific)	community	and	considered	scien-
tific.	But	there	is	no	way	these	rules	could	have	been	forged	in	the	context	




will	 reformulate	 the	 last	phrase	 so	 that	 it	won’t	 lead	us	 in	 that	direction:	
when	calculating,	making	observations,	conducting	experiments	or	pursu-


























odology),	 and	what	 the	practice	of	 science	presents	us	with	was	generated	
by	the	fact	that	we	looked	in	the	wrong	place	for	an	assessment.	In	order	to	
diffuse	 the	 tension,	 it	 is	sufficient	 to	acknowledge	 the	existence	of	 the	fol-





































































We	can	illustrate	this	point	by	looking	at	the	following	example:	If you want 
market competitive and social relevant knowledge of the world, then you 
should prefer scientific theories that exhibit the following virtues…, because, 





















































C. K.:	Science aims at market competitive and social relevant knowledge 
of the world, and acceptance of its theories involves the belief that they 
are good [in terms of satisfying the aim].




















S.C.: Science aims at some socio-cultural contextual knowledge involving
aim, and acceptance of its theories can’t[shouldn’t] imply more than the
belief that they are adequate for [in light of] the contextualized aim.
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Socijalni konstruktivizam i metodologija znanosti
Sažetak
Znanstvena praksa tip je društvene prakse i svako područje znanje uopćeno manifestira važnu 
društvenu dimenziju. No treba li se činjenica da znanstvena praksa nastaje suradničkim trudom 
članova društvene grupe biti povezati s proizvodima takve prakse? U ovom radu nastojim na to 
pitanje odgovoriti afirmativno. Moja će strategija biti argumentirati da cilj znanosti djelomično 
određen društveno-povijesnim uvjetima i da taj cilj, uključujući dostupno pozadinsko znanje, 






Sozialer Konstruktivismus und Methodologie der Wissenschaft
Zusammenfassung
Wissenschaftliche Praxis ist eine Art sozialer Praxis, und jedes Wissensgebiet manifestiert ver-
allgemeinert eine wichtige gesellschaftliche Dimension. Soll jedoch die Tatsache, dass die wis-
senschaftliche Praxis durch mitarbeiterisches Bemühen der Mitglieder einer gesellschaftlichen 
Gruppe entsteht, mit den Produkten einer solchen Praxis in Verbindung stehen? In dieser Arbeit 
bin ich bestrebt, diese Frage affirmativ zu beantworten. Meine Strategie ist das Argument, dass 
das Ziel der Wissenschaft partiell von gesellschaftlich-historischen Bedingungen bestimmt wird, 
und dass dieses Ziel, einschließlich des verfügbaren Hintergrundwissens, hinter der Methodolo-









Constructivisme sociale et méthodologie de la science
Résumé
La pratique scientifique est un genre de pratique sociale, chaque domaine de la connaissance 
manifestant de manière générale une importante dimension sociale. Au vue du fait que la prati-
que scientifique apparaît sur la base d’un commun effort des membres du groupe social, faut-il 
pour autant l’associer avec les productions de telles pratiques ? Dans ce travail, je m’attache à 
répondre à cette question par l’affirmative. Ma stratégie s’appuie sur l’argument selon lequel 
le but de la science, étant partiellement déterminé par des conditions historico-sociales, inclut 
un savoir accessible en arrière-plan, et est motivé par une méthodologie qui est responsable des 
résultats empiriques adéquats et de la théorie qui en résulte.
Mots-clés
constructivisme	sociale,	but	de	la	science,	réalisme	scientifique,	commercialisation	de	la	recherche,	
méthodologie	scientifique
